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For many years, the political landscape in the Hom of Africa has been 
as shifting and unpredictable as the desert sands. In addition to ever-
changing inter-state alignments, the region has been plagued by serious and 
long-running civil wars, persistent droughts, incredible poverty, massive 
famine, a large number of refugees, economic mismanagement and severe 
environmental degradation. To a certain extent, the Hom represents a 
microcosm of the problems that afflict the entire world. Most of these 
problems have been with the region for more than two decades, but they 
have been exacerbated by heightened political instability and uncertainty 
since the late 1980s. By the early 1990s, the old political order was 
beginning to give way. President Mohammed Siad Barre, who had ruled 
Somalia since October 1969, was ousted in January 1991, while President 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had governed Ethiopia since February 1977, 
fled the country in May 1991. Sadly, their departures did not bring about 
an end to their countries' political and economic misery. Sudan, where the 
military took power in June 1989, has also been going through one of its 
worst crises in decades. 
During the Cold War, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan received varying 
levels of assistance from either the East or the West, and could, within 
limits, play one Superpower against the other. Ethiopia enjoyed American 
support from the 1950s until1977, when it turned to the Soviet Union under 
Mengistu's leadership. Moscow, whose influence in Ethiopia soared as a 
result, provided Ethiopia with more than $14 billion worth of arms in the 
1970s and 1980s. During much of this period, the Ethiopian regime was 
buttressed by a large contingent of Cuban troops, some South Yemeni forces 
and East Germany advisers. Most of these departed in the late 1980s. 
Neighbouring Somalia also benefited from US military and economic 
assistance between 1981 and 1989, in return for allowing American military 
forces access to its facilities. Previously, Somalia had obtained large 
quantities of arms from the USSR and played host to significant Soviet naval 
facilities at the Indian Ocean port of Berbera. The break between Somalia 
and the USSR came as a result of Moscow's decision to help Ethiopia 
repulse a Somali invasion in 1977. Sudan, especially during the leadership 
OfGaafar Numeiri, received Soviet military aid in the early 1970s. But from 
, the mid-1970s, Numeiri obtained considerable military and economic 
l:_mstanoe from Woshffigton'. Numeiri was also adept at manipulating the 
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Libyan 'threat' to obtain American assistance, especially during the Reagan 
presidency. 
Following the changes in East-West relations in the 1980s, the collapse 
of Communism and the political whirlwind that swept Eastern Europe from 
1989, the Hom has suffered benign neglect from Moscow and Washington. 
During the Cold War, some critics argued that the Superpower presence was 
a cause of instability in the Hom; but their departure has revealed that 
without them the region is even more unstable. The Hom, already on the 
periphery of world politics like the rest of the Third World, with the 
exception of the Persian Gulf, has been further marginalized by Western 
policies that have focused on the reforming Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in the throes of political rejuvenation. Moscow, for long an 
alternative source of economic and military assistance, is itself competing 
with hapless Third World countries for limited resources in Western 
capitals. The 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath have also helped shift 
attention away from the Hom, thereby accentuating the region's multiple 
problems. 
In the meantime, the Hom, previously regarded as a strategically 
important region, has discovered it has little intrinsic strategic value. Even 
its proximity to the strategically significant Persian Gulf has not helped; this 
was demonstrated in the first few weeks of January 1991, when the change 
of government in Somalia did not catch the attention of senior policy-makers 
in Western countries, except Italy. The US, in protest against human rights 
violations, had cut aid to Somalia in mid-1989, while the USSR also reduced 
its presence in Ethiopia considerably after 1989; Moscow eventually cut 
military supplies following the expiry of the Soviet-Ethiopian agreement in 
January 1991. As the Superpowers have become less of a factor in the 
regional equation in the early 1990s, some Middle Eastern countries, 
including Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria have increased 
their involvement in the region, a development which is likely to provide 
a new source of uncertainty in the future2. 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who had supported Ethiopia's former 
leader Mengistu until the late 1980s, strengthened ties with Siad Barre of 
Somalia and Omar Beshir of Sudan in the late 1980s. Iraq also increased 
support to Sudan and to the Eritrean guerrillas in 1989 and 1990. 
By far the most significant development in the area since the late 1980s 
has undoubtedly been Israel's re-establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Ethiopia, which had been broken off in the wake of the Yom Kippur War 
in 1973. Israel's primary interests in Ethiopia have been partly cultural and 
partly strategic. It sought the emigration of an estimated 18,000 Falashas 
(Ethiopian Jews) to Israel, 14,000 of whom were evacuated just before 
Addis Ababa was captured by the rebel forces in May 1991. Israel has also 
been concerned with Arab activities in the Hom, and it feels that the 
secession of Eritrea (which occasionally receives Arab aid) could tum the 
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Red Sea into an Arab 'lake'. Mengistu, on the other hand, had sought 
military assistance from Israel, and wanted also to use Israel as an opening 
to the United States. 
As of June 1991, the political situation in Ethiopia was quite volatile. 
The new administration, under former guerrilla leader Meles Zenawi, had 
been unable to establish order and most Ethiopians continued to question its 
legitimacy. In Somalia, Siad Barre's successor, former businessman Ali 
Mahdi Mohammed, had been unable to restore basic services in Mogadishu 
or to prevent the northern part of the country from seceding. In Sudan, the 
military strongman, General Omar Beshir, had been unable to come to an 
understanding with the resistance forces in southern Sudan, and the country 
still faced deep-rooted political and security problems, while the Sharia 
(Islamic law), which had ignited the civil war in the early 1980s, was being 
implemented. The immediate result of this political instability has been the 
flow of a large number of refugees across boundaries. 
The great complexity of both internal and intra-regional problems in the 
Hom poses difficulties for analysts and policy-makers alike. The political 
terrain seems forever shifting; patterns can be difficult to discern; and 
predictions - other than that the situation will remain volatile - are 
hazardous. Nevertheless, this chapter attempts to map the major features of 
the changing political fortunes in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan since the end 
of the Cold War. 
Ethiopia: New Leadership- More Uncertainty 
Ethiopia is a key country in the Hom, and its problems often have 
repercussions in neighbouring Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. 
Ethiopia also occupies a special place in Africa, as the headquarters of the 
Organization of African Unity and the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa. As one of the oldest Christian nations in the world, whose people 
claim direct descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, Ethiopia 
possesses a mystique which no other African country has. Always going for 
the high prototype, Ethiopia has also played a bigger role in the Cold War 
than any other sub-Saharan African country. It was host to an American 
military communications base from the 1950s until the mid-1970s; there-
after, it played host to the largest Soviet and Cuban military presence on the 
African continent. The US has once again signalled its reassertion of 
influence in Ethiopia by sponsoring the May 1991 London talks on 
Ethiopia's future and by authorizing the rebel Ethiopian People's Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) guerrillas to occupy Addis Ababa. The 
question is whether Washington and the EPRDF leadership view Ethiopia's 
problems and their solutions from the same angle. It is, in fact, doubtful that 
the EPRDF, in its present form, has the vision and ability to lead Ethiopia 
quickly out of its political and economic mess. Moreover, if Mengistu's 
.L_ 
238 Prospects for Peace 
leadership lacked legitimacy, it is hard to see how the EPRDF leadership 
can convince Ethiopians of its legitimacy. 
Mengistu's escape to Zimbabwe in May 1991 was hailed as a great 
opportunity for Ethiopians to establish peace and stability, but that appeared 
to be a narrow interpretation of Ethiopia's multifaceted problems. Ethio-
pia's difficulties were no doubt exacerbated by Mengistu' s dictatorial rule 
and his misguided macro-economic policies; but, most of them predate his 
leadership. Even before the Mengistu era, Ethiopia was economically 
backward, had an authoritarian and centralized political structure, its 
various nationalities felt oppressed and the war in Eritrea had been going 
on for years. In the light of this situation, Meles Zenawi has a daunting task 
ahead. He needs to maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity while conceding 
autonomy to different nationalities; he needs to allow basic freedoms 
without leaving the country to drift into anarchy; he also needs to create an 
atmosphere conducive to foreign investment. The most difficult task, 
however, is how to dismantle Mengistu' s political and economic structures 
without antagonizing those who have benefited from his programmes, 
especially his land reform policies. 
For generations, imperial, and later Marxist, Ethiopia has been ruled by 
centralized and repressive governments which have been completely 
oblivious to popular demands. The imperial government, which had lasted 
more than 2,000 years when it was terminated in 1974, had ruled provinces 
through dynasties appointed centrally, and most of them originated from 
Shoa and Tigray provinces. By the 1970s, most Ethiopians wanted change, 
but when it came, it was 'hijacked' by the military. The Dergue (military 
junta), which overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, also maintained 
central control over the regions and provinces. In practice, Mengistu's 
policies combined some elements of the Ethiopian imperial tradition and 
Marxist-Leninist principles. It might appear a contradiction in terms, but 
Mengistu ruled, lived and acted like a 'Leninist Tsar' 3• 
The Dergue, of which Mengistu was an original member, initially 
cooperated closely with radical civilian intellectuals, who helped it espouse 
socialism and provided some policy guidance. Its alliance with intellectuals 
was a tactical ploy designed to rally opponents of the imperial regime. The 
Dergue was also anxious to demonstrate that its intervention was prompted 
by the uneven distribution of wealth and the existing archaic and unrepre-
sentative political order, which it sought to change. Its socialist programme 
was concerned with self-reliance, the dignity oflabour and the indivisibility 
of Ethiopian unity, hence the use of the slogan Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia 
First). 
By 1976, Mengistu had emerged as one of the main forces behind the 
secretive Dergue, and in February 1977, he assumed absolute power 
following a bloody confrontation with, and the assassination of, the former 
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against the radical civilian organizations, including the Trotskyite Ethio-
pian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and its arch-rival the All 
Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MElSON). The EPRP, which drew most of 
its support from the intelligentsia and students, was intensely against 
praetorianism. MElSON, on the other hand, had initially served as political 
advisers to the Dergue and had provided ideological guidance to soldiers. 
The two organizations were banned and most of their leaders executed 
during the struggle of the Dergue-spearheaded 'revolutionary red terror' 
against what the Dergue termed 'counter-revolutionary terror' in 1977. 
It was after Mengistu had eliminated all his rivals, both civilian and 
military, that he agreed to establish the Commission for Organizing the 
Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE), which later led to the formation 
of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the first ever political party in 
Ethiopia, in September 1984. The WPE followed the standard procedures 
of a Soviet-stylecommunist party, but, unlike the CPSU which has a federal 
structure, the Ethiopian party was centralized. Although theoretically the 
party operated on the principle of collective leadership, in practice Meng-
istu's word was law. Other political institutions like the Cabinet, the 
National Shengo (Parliament) and the civil service were subordinate to the 
party4• 
In the few years preceding his departure from the political scene, 
Mengistu had come under considerable pressure from Western powers, 
especially the United States, to show more respect for human rights and to 
liberalize the political system. In March 1990, he had announced a package 
of measures designed to encourage political pluralism, including the 
proposal to change the name of the ruling party from the WPE to the 
Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party and to widen its membership to accom-
modate opposition groups, but his critics dismissed them as a transparent 
attempt to buy more time. The 1987 Constitution, which turned Ethiopia 
into a 'People's Democratic Republic', still referred to a one-party state and 
the idea of turning the WPE into a wider, more pluralistic front merely 
succeeded in upsetting WPE members without satisfying the demands for 
democracy. Mengistu also recommended a gradualistic switch from a 
centrally planned economy to a market one, but the bulk of his economic 
measures were greeted with cynicism, because Ethiopia had no proper 
investment codes to encourage foreign investment. Just before his depar-
ture, Mengistu had again tried to placate his opponents by reshuffling his 
Cabinet and naming Tesfaye Dinka, former Foreign Minister, as the new 
Prime Minister, but that attempt did not ease the pressure on him. 
The main challenges to Mengistu since the 1970s came from two 
resistance movements which have now gained power, namely the Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrayan People's Liberation 
Front (TPLF). Both movements achieved extensive military gains between 
1989 and 1991, eventually forcing Mengistu to flee. Although the EPLF 
..l.._ 
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and the TPLF were united against Mengistu, their victory is likely to put 
them at odds with each other, because of their inherently conflicting goals. 
The EPLF, which established itself as a breakaway faction of the 
Eritrean Liberation Front {ELF) in 1971, has always sought full independ-
ence for Eritrea, the former Italian colony that was federated with Ethiopia 
under UN auspices in 1952. Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally dissolved 
the federal arrangement in 1961 and reduced Eritrea to the status of a 
province. That move prompted the establishment of the Muslim-led ELF, 
which wanted autonomy restored5• 
In due course the ELF lost its military potency, and since the mid-1970s 
the EPLF has been the most effective resistance group in Eritrea. Th~ 
EPLF's Secretary-General, Issaias Afwerki, has indicated that the move-
ment would like to organize a referendum to determine the views of the 
Eritrean people on the independence issue, but that is only a tactical ploy 
because the EPLF will not accept anything short of full independence. 
Following the departure of Mengistu, the EPLF established an 'interim' 
administration independent of Addis Ababa, pending a referendum. That 
step has left Ethiopia without its own port, because both Assab and Massawa 
on the Red Sea are within Eritrea, and Zenawi will find it hard to convince 
Ethiopians that their country can do without Eritrea. Zenawi' s first political 
test is whether he can safeguard Ethiopia's territorial integrity by re-
establishing control over Eritrea. 
Zenawi' sown organization, the TPLF, was established in 1975 with the 
help of the EPLF, and is not, therefore, in a position to challenge the 
EPLF' s goal of achieving independence for Eritrea. It emerged on the wave 
of strong resentment in Tigray province against the Dergue's land reform 
policies, which had been welcomed in the southern part of Ethiopia. The 
TPLF, which until recently has been effectively controlled by the pro-
Albanian Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, operated almost entirely in 
Tigray province. The movement initially demanded autonomy for Tigray 
province, but because Tigray has been a part of Ethiopia for more than 2,000 
years, the TPLF could not credibly stake a claim for secession. Moreover, 
Tigray province is inhabited by other ethnic groups, including some Afars 
and Oromos, and these could not accept the TPLF as their legitimate 
representative. The TPLF also realized it could not claim to speak for all 
Tigrayans, because that would have conflicted with the EPLF, which is also 
led by Tigrinya-speakers. 
The TPLF, therefore, sought to modify its image and goals in the early 
1980s. In 1981, it played a leading role in the formation of the Amhara-
dominated Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) and in 1989 
merged with the EPDM to form a new organization named the Ethiopian 
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). This manoeuvre was 
a transparent effort by the TPLF to change its image of a purely provincial 
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tribal grouping in Ethiqpia, and other ethnic groups. By 1991, the EPRDF 
included several other resistance groups, such as the Oromo Liberation 
Front (OLF) and the Free Soldiers Movement (FSM). There has never been 
any doubt, however, that the TPLF, by virtue of its superior military force, 
has been the senior partner in the coalition and has controlled the agenda of 
the EPRDF. It was not surprising, therefore, that when the EPRDF 
captured Addis Ababa in May 1991, it was Zenawi, a TPLF leader, who 
emerged as Ethiopia's interim president6• 
That the EPRDF could switch from its admiration of the Albanian model 
and accept US guidance within months when the opportunity for leadership 
was dangled before it, is not remarkable. What is important is how quickly 
it can start the healing and reconciliation process. It needs not only to eschew 
its previous goals and policies, but it is expected to accept ideas and 
implement policies it never thought out itself. Although it always preached 
against Mengistu' s policies, the EPRDF will find it imperative to accept the 
Dergue's land reform policies, especially as they applied in the south, if it 
wants cooperation from the majority of the Oromos. 
The new leadership will also have to deal with the legacy of war. People 
at war for any extended period oftime often find it difficult to adapt to peace-
time normalcy, and there are many Ethiopians in this category. Most of 
these, including guerrilla forces and more than 300,000 undisciplined and 
armed Mengistu troops, might feel more comfortable with a Kalashnikov 
than a ploughshare. Indeed, Ethiopia has many people who have been 
uprooted or have lost the habit of working and know only how to fight. 
These people constitute a potentially destabilizing force against any 
government in Addis Ababa. 
The fall ofMengistu and the subsequent loss of central control has given 
rise to other groups that are likely to render governing difficult for the 
Zenawi government. Other resistance forces in Ethiopia, which fought 
Mengistu on the sidelines, might in future present formidable problems for 
the new government. The reconciliation process therefore requires not only 
dealing with the former Mengistu supporters, but also making concessions 
to the anti-Mengistu forces. 
Ethiopia's problems, however, seem to pale into insignificance in 
comparison with the disintegration and fighting that Somalia has gone 
through since the overthrow of Said Barre's government in January 1991. 
Somalia: Disintegration and Anarchy 
Following the overthrow of the octogenerian President Siad Barre in 
January 1991, the security situation in Somalia deteriorated beyond the 
predictions of most analysts. The new Somali leader, Ali Mahdi Moham-
med, supported by the local wing of the United Somali Congress (USC), a 
resistance group that was established in 1989, has no resources, no army 
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worth the name or even a disciplined civil service with which to establish 
a respectable post-Barre government. In the confusion that preceded and 
followed the overthrow ofthe Barre regime, government offices and foreign 
embassies were looted, hospitals and schools were ravaged, and there was 
no water or power supply in the capital, Mogadishu, for months. Ali 
Mohammed was also installed in office promptly in controversial circum-
stances, without the approval of the USC headquarters in Rome or the 
support of other resistance movements, especially the more experienced 
Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(SPM). 
Given the lawlessness in the country, the squalid conditions in which 
most Somalis live and the continuous struggle for power in Mogadishu, it 
appears all Ali Mohammed has inherited is the anarchy left behind after 22 
years ofBarre's rule. It has been like putting old wine in new bottles, which 
makes no substantial difference. Unable to control Mogadishu, Ali Moham-
med had no power to prevent the northern part of Somalia, the former 
British Somaliland, which had united with Italian Somaliland in 1960 to 
form the Somali Demoracrtic Republic, from seceding in May 1991. All 
this has come at a time when virtually all foreign powers, except Italy, have 
abandoned Somalia7• 
The mounting political and economic problems in Somalia call for a 
leadership that can restore integrity in the political institutions, rebuild the 
economy and restore foreign confidence in the country. Before Barre's 
departure, a group of Somali and Italian lawyers had completed a draft of 
a new multi-party constitution for Somalia. But even then, a new constitu-
tion will make little difference in the anarchy that prevails in much of 
Somalia. Indeed, none of the envisaged reforms will be possible until 
Somali clans have stopped fighting each other. 
Somalia's relative stability in the 1970s and early 1980s depended on 
Barre's skilful manipulation of both domestic and external politics. At the 
international level, the Cold War gave Barre some bargaining power 
through which he obtained substantial economic and military assistance, 
first from the Soviet Union and later from the United States. At the domestic 
level, he maintained power by often suppressing critics and detaining 
opponents; by balancing and playing on clan interests and rivalries; and, 
occasionally, by buying out opposition groups with cash. By the late 1980s, 
however, his external bargaining power had gone with the waning of the 
Cold War, and internally his military muscle had weakened due to inter- and 
intra-clan rivalries. It had also become increasingly obvious that he had 
neither the skill to manipulate sectional and regional interests nor the vision 
to lead the country quickly out of its political quagmire. Significantly, 
Barre's manipulative power waned as Somalia's economic problems mul-
tiplied, a fact which demonstrates the crucial role of the economy in what 
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By the time Barre was toppled in January 1991, his government was 
corrupt, intensely unpopular and unable to exercise effective control even 
in Mogadishu. Barre had started as a nationalist dictator, with great regional 
ambitions. By the late 1980s, he was often referred to as the Mayor of 
Magadishu, because that was the only area of the country he controlled 
permanently, but even that title was removed from him as power was 
increasingly taken away from him and to no particular individual or group. 
The military, which had served as one of Barre's pillars of power, had 
disintegrated into what looked like clan militias8• 
The civil service was totally demoralized and Barre's Cabinet often 
functioned like a federation of clans in which power was commensurate with 
loyalty to the leader. At the same time, Barre had maintained an autocratic 
and centralized system which was totally inappropriate to the segmentary 
character of the Somali society. 
For generations, the single most important factor in Somali society has 
been the clan. Although all Somalis enjoy a sense of common identity based 
on a shared culture, the clan loyalty often undercuts the sense of shared 
nationhood. Somalia's ethnic problems are, however, different from those 
that afflict other African countries. While most African states are striving 
to create nations out of diverse ethnic groups, Somalia is basically a nation 
in search of a state. All Somalis belong to one ethnic group, speak the same 
language, and generally appear united by their devotion to Islam, but they 
also attach great significance to their clan family system. Their social and 
economic activities, as well as political organization, have traditionally 
stemmed from lineage systems based on one of the six major clan families 
- Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye, Issaq and Rahanwein9 • 
The six family groups are further split into smaller clans and lineages. 
For instance, among the Darod clan family are the Dolbahante, Majerteen, 
Marehan and Ogadeni. 
Somali clans play two contradictory roles, as centrifugal and centripetal 
forces, whereby there is solidarity against external threats and antagonism 
when the threat vanishes. For instance, Somalis appeared quite united in the 
periods when the government in Mogadishu pursued irredentist goals 
against neighbouring Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, with a view to uniting 
all Somali-inhabited regions of the Hom into a Greater Somalia nation. 
Whenever the government sought peace with the neighbours, as was the case 
in the late 1960s and again in the 1980s, Somali clans turned against each 
other to try to find a scapegoat for their predicament. In the late 1980s, 
unrest had appeared in the armed forces shortly after Barre had agreed to the 
Somali-Ethiopianaccord of April1988, to end mutual hostilities and refrain 
from supporting each other's opponents. The agreement, which also called 
for the demilitarization ofthe border and effectively amounted to Somalia's 
renunciation of its claims to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, was resented 
by Ogadenis in the Somali army. They felt their homeland had been 
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abandoned and directed their anger towards Barre. 
Earlier in his tenure, Barre, who sought to transform Somali nationalism 
from its old segmentary kind to a modern organic mode, banned clanismand 
prohibited any reference to clans in the early 1970s. He adopted 'scientific 
socialism' in an effort to unite the nation. But, at the same time, he tried to 
consolidate his power base by relying on three clans from the Darod group: 
the Marehan, Ogadeni and Dolbahante. Most senior positions in the 
military and the civil service went to members of the three clans. Barre's 
advisers also came from the same sources, and in the 1970s, his government 
was often disparagingly referred to as MOD (Marehan, Ogadeni and 
Dolbahante). There is no doubt that clans and lineages are still a potent force 
and determine the course of Somalia's political development. Clan and 
lineage affiliations also have been vital in obtaining jobs, services and 
favours. 
In the past, various family groupings often fought each other over access 
to grazing areas and water in a harsh environment; occasionally, there were 
armed conflicts even between segments of the same clan family. In some 
cases, temporary alliances were formed between clans of different families. 
The traditional social structure in Somalia was characterized by competition 
and conflicts between these clan-family groups. Indeed, clan conflicts and 
rivalries have been a feature of Somali politics for a long time. 
Even the resistance groups in Somalia have been based on clans and have 
basically been seeking a bigger share of the political plums. The Somali 
National Movement (SNM), formed in 1981 and nurtured by the Ethiopian 
government, is dominated by the Issaq clan of northern Somalia. It started 
to wage war in northern Somalia in mid-1988, when it was forced to leave 
its Ethiopian bases, following the Somali-Ethiopian accord of April1988. 
The SNM, because of its superior fighting force, had hoped it would be the 
one to form a successor regime after the overthrow of Barre, but when that 
happened in January 1991, it was the United Somali Congress (USC), 
dominated by the Hawiye clan of central Somalia, that formed an interim 
government. The USC was established in Rome in 1989 and did not have 
a strong fighting force until late 1990 when it was joined by many former 
army personnel who had defected from Barre's army. The third resistance 
group, which also emerged in 1989, is the Ogadeni-based Somali Patriotic 
Movement (SPM), which occupies southern Somalia. 
After the overthrow of Barre, the three groups, and others, tried to work 
out a power-sharing formula, but it was not satisfactory to the SNM, who 
had borne the brunt of fighting more than any other group. From the 
moment Ali Mohammed was sworn in as interim president, it was clear the 
SNM was not going to cooperate with the new government, and its decision 
in May 1991 to declare northern Somalia independent from the rest of 
Somalia was done out of frustration. But, like the case of Eritrea, the 
secession of northern Somalia itself signifies the durability of African 
J 
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colonial boundaries, which were drawn up in Berlin in 1884, without due 
regard for ethnic distribution in Africa. If northern Somalia secedes 
permanently, it would deprive the rest of the country of one of the most 
productive regions, known for livestock production. It also signals the 
further disintegration of Somalia, which instead of uniting all Somali-
inhabited regions of the Hom, might split up into clan-based mini-states. 
Any attempt by the new Somali government to address Somalia's present 
political and economic difficulties will not make much progress unless the 
Somalis are united. The trouble is that without some tangible political and 
economic rewards, it is hard to get the poverty-stricken clans to cooperate. 
With a per capita GDP of about US$170, Somalia is one of the poorest 
countries in the world. Its development over the years has been related to 
the amount of external fmancing, both as support in meeting domestic 
development expenditure and to pay for the imported materials and 
technical assistance components. Development has stagnated in the past few 
years because virtually all Western donors, except Italy, cut aid in 1989 in 
protest against Barre's human rights record and have not resumed supply. 
Without foreign assistance, Somalia's chances of economic recovery are 
virtually nil, but it is also hard to see how Western donors would resume 
aid to Somalia under the present circumstances. Thus Somalia's anarchic 
conditions discourage foreign aid and investment, yet it is only with such 
aid and investment that these problems can be overcome. 
Another country in the Hom that has been abandoned by the West is 
Sudan, which also faces enormous political and economic problems. 
Sudan: Islamic Intransigence 
Oblivious to the chilling political developments in neighbouring states, 
the military government of General Hassan Omar Beshir in Sudan still 
tenuously clings to power. The challenge to Beshir comes from both the 
north and south of the country: northern politicians, who resent the massive 
erosion of their freedoms and the ban on political activities, want a civilian 
regime; in the south, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by 
John Garang, has been fighting for the political and economic rights of the 
southerners since 1983. As ofthis writing, the political atmosphere in Sudan 
is still overcast, and it might not be long before the SPLA takes effective 
control of southern Sudan. 
Beshir came to office through a military coup on 30 June 1989, and has 
since consolidated power in Khartoum with the support of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. His rule has not only led to the erosion of people's freedoms, 
but it has also compounded the economic malaise in the country. In the 
meantime, Sudan's decade-old problems, which have revolved around the 
need for popular participation in the political process, the role of the Sharia 
(Islamic law), especially since 1983, and the autonomy of the southern 
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region, still remain. 
Under Gaafar Numeiri's leadership from 1969 to 1985, Sudan experi-
enced an authoritarian, corrupt and unpredictable regime. Numeiri, who 
came to power through a military coup, was suspicious of everybody and 
kept playing off one politician or political faction against another. In the 
course of his ideological zigzags, Numeiri alienated virtually all sections of 
the population at different times and forced most opposition groups into 
exile or underground. With a view to using the southern Sudanese against 
his adversaries in the north, Numeiri agreed to autonomy for the southerners 
in 1972. In the late 1970s, supported by the United States and Saudi Arabia, 
Numeiri engaged in a policy of 'national reconciliation' -an effort to bring 
his opponents home from exile and into the government. As he increasingly 
came under the influence of northern politicians who were hostile to the 
southerners, Numeiri decided to dismantle regional autonomy for the south 
in 1983. That move sparked off the civil war that still continues. Numeiri 
had differed sharply with Islamic fundamentalists and other religious 
groups in the early 1970s while he enjoyed the short-lived support of the 
local communists, whom he later persecuted. By the early 1980s, political 
opportunism led Numeiri to make peace with the Muslim Brotherhood, 
surprising even some of his close associates in 1983 when he announced 
suddenly the introduction of the Sharia in 1983 10• 
When Numeiri was overthrown by General Abdulrahman Swareddahab 
in April1985, it was expected that Sudan might once again move towards 
democracy. Within less than one year, Swareddahab permitted a multi-party 
system, and later handed power to a civilian government following the 
general elections of April 1986. But Sudan experimented with democracy 
for just three years before the civilian Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, who 
had been indecisive on many important matters, was also toppled by General 
Hassan Omar Beshir in the coup of June 1989. Beshir, who has relied on 
Islamic fundamentalists to consolidate his power, abolished political 
parties, detained leading politicians, suspended the constitution and banned 
civilian newspapers. He has set out to implement the Sharia, but his 
authoritarian rule has plunged Sudan into a deeper crisis than the one he 
inherited. Beshir's regime is the only one in the region which has not 
responded positively to international pressures for political liberalization, 
and this is largely because of its reliance on the support of Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, who strongly resent external pressure. 
Meanwhile, Sudan's insurgency problems, which stem from religious, 
cultural, racial and historical factors, have remained. The British colonial 
authorities, who ruled northern and southern Sudan as separate parts, 
accentuated already-existing animosties between northerners and southern-
ers. During the colonial period, northerners could not travel to, or live in, 
the south without a special permit. Moreover, while Arabic was the 
language of instruction in northern schools, it was banned in the south and 
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English was used instead. As a result, the two parts of Sudan developed as 
completely different entities. As independence approached in the mid-
1950s, the southerners, largely Christians and of African descent, feared 
domination by the Arab-Muslim northerners, and they accordingly de-
manded a federation, with a separate advisory council for the south. When 
their demands were rejected, the southerners rebelled in November 1955 
and formed a guerrilla organization calledAnyanya. Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, Anyanya leaders argued that the central government in Khar-
toum was dictatorial and discriminated against southerners on cultural and 
religious grounds. They continued fighting the government until Numeiri 
agreed to give them autonomy in 1972, and when that autonomy was taken 
away in 1983, fighting resumed, but this time the guerrilla group was the 
Sudan People's Liberation Army. 
The establishment of the SPLA, and its political wing the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), in 1983, also was based on a 
combination of other political and economic issues, including the discovery 
of oil, the Jonglei Canal and the Sharia. The issue of oil became explosive 
shortly after crude oil had been discovered by the French firm, Chevron, 
at Bentiu in the south in 1979. Numeiri wanted to build a refinery in the 
north, but southerners wanted it built at Bentiu to stimulate the economy of 
their region. Numeiri later announced a plan for a pipeline to connect the 
south directly to the Red Sea for the export of crude oil, a move that made 
southerners feel they would receive little revenue from what they saw as 
their oil. 
Numeiri's decision to construct the Jonglei Canal to make for a more 
efficient use of water from the River Nile also proved contentious. This 
project was conceived in the 1930s by Egyptians who felt that nearly half 
of the Nile water was lost through evaporation in the Sudd, and wanted to 
drain it through a canal. The Sudanese and Egyptian governments did not 
agree on the scheme until1974, but it was deeply resented by southerners, 
who argued that the project was undertaken without sufficient consultation 
with them. Although it was planned that 25% of the water increase would 
be used in the south, the southerners felt the project was designed to serve 
the interests of Egypt and northern Sudan, and that it would disadvantage 
the south. 
The controversy over the Jonglei Canal and a demand for a share ofthe 
oil revenue, were part of the accumulated grievances about inadequate 
development financing and the feeling that the south was being discrimi-
nated against in relation to the north. If southerners needed confirmation of 
their fears that the north was not ready to deal with them fairly, these issues, 
in addition to the imposition of the Sharia, provided it. 
It was under these circumstances that the SPLA emerged. The move-
ment, which received early support from Ethiopia and Libya, seeks the 
5 abolition of the Sharia and the establishment of a more democratic system 
/; 
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in the whole of Sudan, but its military gains in the south might lead to de 
facto secession, that would not necessarily bring about peace to southern 
Sudan, because the region has more than 25 different ethnic groups and there 
are some differences among the major groups. Smaller tribes often fear that 
the secession of the southern region might lead to their domination by the 
numerically preponderant Dinka tribe, which controls the SPLA/SPLM. 
In the 1980s, various Sudanese governments failed to come to terms with 
the SPLA to end the civil war. As of this writing, there is no indication that 
the two sides are any closer to a peaceful resolution of their dispute. Sadiq 
al-Mahdi - whose government at various times included his own Umma 
Party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) and minor southern parties- had proved ineffective and indecisive on 
the interrelated and sensitive questions oflslamic law and the civil war. The 
government's inability to reach even limited agreement was hardly surpris-
ing, for the three major parties that made up the coalition held virtually 
irreconcilable views on these problems, particularly that of the future of the 
Sharia. For instance, the SPLA and the DUP had signed a draft peace 
agreement in Addis Ababa inN ovember 1988, but Mahdi refused to endorse 
it, thereby prompting the DUP to withdraw from the government in 
December 1988. 
Early in 1989, the Sudanese army, which had been frustrated by a lack 
of equipment and by the military victories achieved by the SPLA, tried to 
put pressure on the Prime Minister to re-examine the role of Islamic law and 
to end the civil war. It sent Mahdi a memorandum on 20 February 1989 
demanding, within one week, an end to the government's pro-Libyan 
policy, the formation of a broad-based government, the reduction oflslamic 
fundamentalist influence in the government and initiatives to end the civil 
war. Mahdi, as usual, hesitated, but after meeting with Armed Forces 
Commander-in-Chief, General Fathi Ahmed Ali, on 2 March 1989, he 
accepted the general thrust of the memorandum. As a result, the NIF, by far 
the best organized political grouping in the country, left his government, 
and Mahdi now had to form another coalition government with the DUP and 
the minor southern parties. This vacillation on Mahdi 's part made any 
positive action by the government impossible. Not only was his government 
unable to operate with any efficiency, he appeared to be seeking compro-
mise with other political parties as an end in itself, rather than as a means 
to some larger end. 
Beshir and his ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) for 
National Salvation claimed in 1989 that one of their main reasons for 
intervening in politics was to work out an acceptable formula for ending the 
civil war. Beshir's peace plan, announced in late 1989, envisaged a federal 
arrangement in which any unit would be free to opt out oflslamic law. The 
main thrust of Beshir's proposal was that Sudan could be partitioned, but 
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effectively mean that Khartoum and the rest of the more developed northern 
Sudan would be governed by the Sharia and any non-Muslim southerner 
who worked th~re would be subject to these laws. This was unacceptable to 
the SPLA, which reiterated its demand for the abolition of the Sharia, the 
formation of an interim government, the lifting of bans on political 
organizations and the reconstitution of the Sudanese army to include SPLA 
troops. 
Conclusions 
The Hom's complex and precarious political situation, mounting 
economic difficulties and long-running civil wars, which stem from local 
sources, have been exacerbated by the decline of the Superpower presence 
and the general indifference of the Western world. While it is true that 
solutions to the problems in the Horn or elsewhere in Africa have to come 
from within, given the circumstances outlined above, the local parties need 
external support, and the reduction of the Superpower presence in the region 
has raised questions about future brokers in these countries' internal and 
regional conflicts. The US showed some interest in Ethiopia just before the 
fall of the Mengistu government, but whether it will go ahead and help the 
new government establish a stable regime remains to be seen. Due to what 
is inappropriately called donor fatigue, but which might mean something 
more sinister, other Western powers appear to have no interest in the 
desperate economic plight of Ethiopia or its neighbours. The likely problem 
if the US alone were involved is that its visibility would make the new 
Ethiopian government look like Washington's puppet - an image that would 
essentially undermine the new regime's legitimacy and possibly cause local 
disaffection with it. 
Western critics and governments have urged African leaders in the past 
few years to liberalize their political systems and, in particular, establish 
multi-party systems as a demonstration of their commitment to democracy. 
There is no doubt about the efficacy of a multi-party system in a society that 
understands and accepts the Western notion of democracy. What is in 
question is the obsession with form which can be quite misleading u!lless 
content is also given equal weight. But how far can the international 
community go in ensuring that content matches form without seriously 
undermining the sovereignty of the countries in question? Moreover, the 
Ethiopian and Somali leaders, who are expected to carry out these 
democratic reforms, have never experienced democracy in their lives. 
Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Ali Mohammed in Somalia will find it 
convenient to mime the language of democracy which is expected of them 
by their Western sponsors and prospective donors, but there is little 
evidence that th~y fully understand the meaning and have the ability to 
translate these words into action. The likely outcome of the so-called 
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democratic measures which African leaders are undertaking might be the 
creation of some political structures that give the appearance of democracy, 
but the reality might be something else. 
In the meantime, the security situation in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan 
shows no sign of settling down. The new government in Ethiopia is yet to 
take shape, but it is already at war with an internal opposition which appears 
to be comprised of some of the remnants of Mengistu's forces. As an 
umbrella organization, the EPRDF was effective in opposition, but it is still 
too early to say whether its various components, especially the TPLF, the 
Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement, the Oromo Liberation Front 
. and the Free Soldiers Movement, will continue to cooperate now that they 
are in government. One issue that is likely to divide the EPRDF is the future 
of Eritrea. The EPLF, which had fought for Eritrea's independence for 
more than two decades, has declared a separate administration for the 
territory. The independence of Eritrea will create enormous political 
problems for the Zenawi government in Addis Ababa. Indeed, as it looks 
now, the Zenawi regime will merely hang onto power, but unless Ethiopia 
remains intact, it will neither govern much of the country nor be able to 
provide much of a life for those under its control. 
The situation in Somalia points to continued disintegration, with the 
SNM firmly in control of northern Somalia, the USC in Mogadishu and the 
surrounding region, while the SPM occupies the southern tip of the country. 
An Italian diplomat said in 1990 that Somalia could not live with Barre, but 
it also could not live without him; those words now carry more meaning than 
they did when they were uttered. The problems in Somalia defy any clear-
cut description, but without a strong leader in the form of an enlightened 
Leviathan, the country will continue on its fast trajectory towards anarchy. 
The Sudanese government, whose forces are still engaged in war with SPLA 
guerrillas, is clearly in a weakened state. Although neither side appears to 
be able to overcome the other, the course of the talks they have held in the 
past have indicated that there is little basis for a renewal of negotiations 
between them. Beshir's power base appears to be very fragile; since he 
increasingly relies on Islamic fundamentalists for support, there seems little 
possibility of replacing Islamic law. With the Sudanese economy still in a 
shambles and under these conditions little reason to expect further foreign 
investment, the possibility of meaningful recovery is remote. At best, the 
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